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1.  Introduction 
 
If there is a topic at the center of international macroeconomics, it is fixed versus 
flexible exchange rates. Whether teaching Mundell-Fleming, speaking about the 
Impossible Trinity, or writing about “excess” volatility, the fixed-versus-flexible debate 
is deeply relevant. At the same time, many of the issues in this debate remain unresolved. 
Important among them is the regime-volatility puzzle: similar macroeconomic 
environments produce much more exchange-rate volatility under flexible-rate regimes 
(e.g., Flood and Rose 1995).
1 This finding has prompted many authors to conclude that 
the critical determinants of flexible-rate volatility are not macroeconomic. It is unclear, 
however, what these non-macro determinants might be. 
This paper addresses the regime-volatility puzzle from a new perspective. Our 
approach augments the traditional macro-asset approach with some price-determination 
microeconomics. In particular, we focus our theoretical and empirical analysis on the role 
of order flow. (Order flow is signed volume; seller-initiated trades are negative order 
flow and buyer-initiated trades are positive order flow.) In microeconomic models of 
asset-price determination, order flow plays an important causal role that arises because 
order flow conveys information. The type of information that order flow conveys 
includes any information that is relevant to the realization of uncertain demands, so long 
as that information is not common knowledge. (If common knowledge—as is generally 
assumed in macro exchange-rate models—then price adjusts without any need for an 
order-flow role.) For example, order flow may convey information about dispersed shifts 
in portfolio balance (e.g., shifts in hedging demands or risk tolerances), or about 
differential interpretation of common news. In a non-common-knowledge setting, order 
                                                                 
1 To some, lower volatility under fixed rates may seem obvious. But empirically, fixed rates do have a distribution over 
time (due to parity changes). And in most models, keeping the variance of this distribution below that under flexible 
rates requires keeping the variance of fundamentals below that under flexible rates. As an empirical matter, this has not 
been the case, per Flood and Rose (1995). Our explanation provides a source of volatility that operates only under 
flexible rates, but is not included among the fundamentals previously considered.   2
flow becomes the intermediate link between evolving information and price—a 
proximate cause of price movements (Evans and Lyons 1999). 
 Order flow is potentially relevant for a high-level debate like fixed-versus-flexible 
because its impact on exchange rates is persistent. Though our model makes this 
persistence explicit, let us provide some perspective. Note that if order flow conveys 
information, then its price impact should persist, at least under the identifying assumption 
used regularly in empirical work that information effects on price are permanent (e.g., 
French and Roll 1986, Hasbrouck 1991). That is not to suggest that order flow cannot 
also have transitory effects on price, e.g., from temporary indigestion effects (sometimes 
called inventory effects). But insofar as order flow communicates information—along the 
lines noted in the previous paragraph—then some portion of order flow’s effects on price 
will persist. 
Order flow may be key to resolving the regime-volatility puzzle. One reason it has 
not been considered to date is because empirical work on this puzzle examines macro 
determinants, whereas order flow is generally viewed as non-macro.
2 If order flow is 
indeed a determinant, then it might explain why flexible regimes produce more volatility 
than macroeconomics predicts. There is now considerable evidence that the “if” part of 
that last sentence is met: order flow is a determinant (Lyons 1995, Evans 1999, Payne 
1999, Evans and Lyons 1999, Rime 2000). Whether the relation found by these authors 
for flexible rates is affected by differences in exchange-rate regime is an open question, 
however, one that we address in this paper (both theoretically and empirically). 
The main lesson from the theoretical portion of the paper is the following: exchange 
rates are more volatile under flexible rates because of order flow. Importantly, this is not 
because order flow is more volatile under flexible rates (indeed, its volatility is 
unchanged in our model across regimes). The intuition for order flow’s role is tied to the 
                                                                 
2 Though generally viewed as non-macro, order f low need not be divorced from macro. Consider models in 
microstructure finance, where order flow signals that some agents’ expectations about future fundamentals have 
changed. For exchange rates, one can write the price of foreign exchange, Pt, as a function of current and expected 
future macro fundamentals:  (,) 1 = +
e Pgff ttt . Order flow may be the way that price-setters learn about changes in  1 +
e
ft . 
Under this hypothesis, order flow is a proximate cause of price changes, but macro (macro expectations) remains the 
underlying cause. Note too that this hypothesis offers a potential explanation for the empirical results of Meese and 
Rogoff (1983): if the macro variables that order flow forecasts are largely beyond the one-year horizon, then the 
empirical link between exchange rates and current macro variables will be loose. That Meese-Rogoff-style empirical 
results are more positive at horizons beyond one year is consistent with this “anticipation” hypothesis.   3
elasticity of speculative demand. Under flexible rates, the elasticity of speculative 
demand is (endogenously) low: volatility causes rational speculators to trade less 
aggressively. Their reduced willingness to take the other side of shocks to order flow 
makes room for portfolio-balance effects on price. The size of those portfolio-balance 
effects is determined by the size of the observed order-flow shocks. This is the price-
relevant information that order-flow conveys. Under credibly fixed rates, the elasticity of 
speculative demand is infinite (return volatility shrinks to zero), which precludes 
portfolio-balance effects, thereby eliminating order flow’s information role. 
Consequently, order flow as a return factor is shut down. 
To test our explanation for regime-dependent volatility empirically, we exploit a 
natural experiment for why order flow can induce volatility under flexible rates, but not 
under fixed rates. The natural experiment is the switch from flexible (wide band) to 
rigidly fixed rates in the transition from the European Monetary System (EMS) to the 
European Monetary Union (EMU).
3 Starting in January 1999, the euro-country currencies 
have been rigidly fixed to one another—as close to a perfectly credible fixed-rate regime 
as one might hope to observe. Before January 1999, however—particularly before May 
1998—there was still uncertainty about which internal parities would be chosen and 
about the timing of interest-rate harmonization in the May-to-December period.  
Figure 1 provides an initial, suggestive illustration of our results. It shows the 
relationship between the FF/DM exchange rate in 1998 and cumulative order flow. 
(These are interdealer orders; see section 3 for details.) In panel A, order flow is 
measured as the number of buyer-initiated trades minus the number of seller-initiated 
trades (consistent with Evans and Lyons 1999). In panel B, order flow is measured in DM 
amounts rather than numbers of trades. The vertical line is 4 May 1998. This was the first 
trading day after the announcement of the internal parities of the euro-participating 
currencies.
4 The positive relationship between the two series before that date is clear: the 
                                                                 
3 Though it allowed some flexibility, the EMS was not a free float. That said, the transition to EMU was indisputably a 
transition toward exchange-rate fixity. Low variability of the FF/DM rate in the EMS portion of our sample (relative to 
major flexible rates such as Yen/$) does not undermine the validity of our tests. (Variability in that portion of our 
sample was certainly high enough to be significant economically for market participants, given the low transaction 
costs.) Extending the model of the next section to environments of imperfectly credible fixed rates is a natural direction 
for further research. 
 
4 On the weekend of May 2/3, 1998, the Council of EU finance ministers (ECOFIN) decided which countries would 
become founder members of the euro.  They also decided on the internal parities for the euro-zone currencies.     4
correlation is about 0.7. (This accords with the strong positive relationship under flexible 
rates found for other currencies and samples, e.g., by Evans and Lyons 1999 and Rime 
2000). After 4 May, however, there is a sharp unwinding of long DM positions with no 
corresponding movement in the exchange rate. In fact, there is a negative correlation 
during the second period. Though total variation in the exchange rate is small (roughly 20 
times the median bid-offer spread), the effect of order flow appears to have changed from 
one of clear impact—as has been found in other studies for flexible rates—to one of no 
impact.
5 (Visually it appears the relationship is loosening in April, but the statistical 
evidence of a break we provide below does not emerge until early May.) The model we 
develop in the following section provides a framework for addressing why these order-
flow effects might disappear, and how their disappearance helps to resolve the regime-
volatility puzzle. 
Our paper is the first in the literature to address fixed versus flexible rates using the 
concept of order flow (despite the concept’s long history within the field of finance). The 
two most closely related bodies of work on fixed-versus-flexible rates include the 
balance-of-payments flow approach and a more recent literature that introduces non-
rational traders to account for high flexible-regime volatility. Work on the balance-of-
payments flow approach dates back to Robinson (1949) and Machlup (1949). (See also 
the survey in Rosenberg 1996.) In those models, exchange rates are determined from 
balance-of-payments flows, e.g., imports and exports. Balance-of-payments flows 
depend, in turn, on the exchange-rate regime. Empirically, however, this approach has 
not borne fruit: balance-of-payments flows are unsuccessful in accounting for exchange-
rate movements (see, e.g., Frankel and Rose 1996).
6 The second related body of work 
introduces non-rational traders to account for high flexible-regime volatility, for example, 
Hau (1998) and Jeanne and Rose (1999). In both of these papers, the mechanism that 
induces volatility under flexible rates is entry of traders in the foreign-exchange market, 
which increases the level of noise. The mechanism in our (rational) model is different. In 
                                                                 
5 A test of whether the variance is equal across the two sub-periods is rejected at the 5 percent level. 
6  These negative empirical results are less applicable to the noise-trade models of Osler (1998) and Carlson and Osler 
(2000) because the “current account” flows in those models can be interpreted more broadly (e.g., as flows from 
hedging demand), which need not manifest as identifiable balance-of-payments flows. Importantly for our approach 
here, order flows and balance-of-payment flows are not one to one; see, e.g., the discussion in Lyons (2001), chapter 9.    5
our case it is the endogenous unwillingness of speculators to take the other side of order-
flow shocks that produces higher volatility. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model 
and the analytical results that provide a new explanation for the regime-dependent 
volatility puzzle. Section 3 describes our data. Section 4 presents empirical tests of our 
model’s implications. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Model 
 
The trading model developed in this section serves three important purposes. First, 
it expresses market dynamics in terms of measurable variables, most notably order flow.
7 
The type of order flow that is currently measurable (the type shown in Figure 1) is 
interdealer order flow, which necessitates a specification of interdealer trading behavior 
and how that behavior relates to underlying demands in the economy. Second, the model 
provides a clear demonstration of the type of dispersed information that order flow can 
convey, and how that information is subsequently impounded in price. Third, the model 
shows why under flexible rates order flow (cumulative) and price share a long run, co-
integrating relationship. The properties of this relationship and how it is affected by the 
shift to fixed rates provide a set of testable implications that we examine empirically in 
section 4.  
The model includes two trading regimes: a flexible-rate regime followed by a fixed-
rate regime. The shift from flexible to fixed rates is a random event that arrives with 
constant probability p at the end of each trading day (after all trading).
8 Once the regime 
has shifted to fixed rates it remains there indefinitely. Though a regime shift is not 
included in the model of Evans and Lyons (1999), our specification of trading within 
each day is identical to that earlier specification, so our exposition below is fullest in 
areas where the models differ. 
                                                                 
7 This is not a property of more abstract approaches to modeling trading, for example, rational expectations models 
(such as Grossman and Stiglitz 1980 and Diamond and Verrecchia 1981), which are not directly estimable. (In rational 
expectations models, trades cannot be identified as a buy or a sell because counterparties are symmetric—neither side is 
the initiator.) 
8 This formulation has two important advantages. First, the effective horizon over which foreign exchange is priced in 
the flexible-rate regime remains constant. Second, the parameter p provides a compact means of describing regime 
shifts as far or near. As an empirical matter, particularly in the context of the EMS-EMU transition, this specification 
serves as a convenient abstraction from reality.   6
Consider an infinitely lived, pure-exchange economy with two assets, one riskless 
and one with stochastic payoffs (foreign exchange). Each day t, foreign exchange earns a 








t RR   (1) 
 
The increment  DRt  is observed publicly on day t before trading. These realized 
increments represent innovations over time in public macroeconomic information (e.g., 
changes in interest rates). Under the flexible-rate regime, the DRt increments are i.i.d. 
Normal(0,
2 s R ). On the first morning of the fixed rate regime, the central bank (credibly) 
commits to pegging the exchange rate at the previous day’s closing price and maintains 
DRt=0 thereafter. 
The foreign exchange market is organized as a dealership market with N dealers, 
indexed by  i, and a continuum of non-dealer customers (the public). The mass of 
customers on [0,1] is large (in a convergence sense) relative to the N dealers. (This 
assumption will drive the model’s overnight risk-sharing features.) Dealers and 
customers all have identical negative exponential utility defined over periodic wealth, 
with coefficient of absolute risk aversion q.  
The timing of trading within each day is summarized in Figure 2. Within each day 
there are three trading rounds. In the first round, dealers trade with the public. In the 
second round, dealers trade among themselves (to share the resulting inventory risk). In 
the third round, dealers trade again with the public (to share inventory risk throughout the 
economy).  
Each day begins with public observation of the payoff Rt. Then each dealer quotes a 
scalar price to his customers at which he agrees to buy and sell any amount (quoting is 
simultaneous and independent).
9 We denote this round 1 price of dealer i on day t as  1
it P . 
Each dealer then receives a customer-order realization  1
it C  that is executed at his quoted 
                                                                 
9 Introducing a bid-offer spread (or price schedule) in round one to endogenize the number of dealers is a 
straightforward—but distracting—extension.    7
price 1
it P . Let  1
it C <0 denote net customer selling (dealer i buying). The individual  1
it C ’s are 
distributed  
1
it C  ~ Normal (0, 2
C s ) 
 
They are uncorrelated across dealers and uncorrelated with the payoff Rt at all leads and 
lags. These orders represent exogenous portfolio shifts of the non-dealer public. Their 
realizations are not publicly observable, and they arrive every day, regardless of regime 
(with an unchanged distribution). For the analysis below, it is useful to define the 
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In round 2, each dealer quotes a scalar price to other dealers at which he agrees to 
buy and sell any amount (simultaneous and independent). These interdealer quotes are 
observable and available to all dealers. Each dealer then trades on other dealers’ quotes 
(simultaneous and independent). Orders at a given price are split evenly across dealers 
quoting that price. Let Tit denote the (net) interdealer trade initiated by dealer i in round 2 
(we denote T it as negative for dealer-i net selling). At the close of round 2, all dealers 







it t T X
1
.  (2) 
 
In round 3 of each day, dealers share overnight risk with the non-dealer public. 
Unlike round 1, the public’s motive for trading in round 3 is non-stochastic and purely 
speculative. Initially, each dealer quotes a scalar price  3
it P  at which he agrees to buy and 
sell any amount (simultaneous and independent). These quotes are observable and 
available to the public. We assume that aggregate public demand for the risky asset in 
round-3, denoted  3
t C , is less than infinitely elastic. With the earlier assumptions, this 
allows Evans and Lyons to write public demand as a linear function of expected return:   8
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Thus, the positive coefficient g captures the elasticity of public demand—the public’s 
aggregate willingness to absorb exchange rate risk. The information in  3
t W  is that 
available to the public at the time of trading in round three of day t (which includes all 




The equilibrium relation between interdealer order flow and price adjustment 
follows from results established for the simultaneous-trade model of Lyons (1997). 
Consider the determination of prices. Propositions 1 and 2 of that paper show that each 
trading round, all dealers quote a common price (this is necessary to prevent arbitrage). It 
follows that this price is conditioned on common information only. Though Rt is common 
information on day t at the beginning of round 1, order flow X t is not observed until the 
end of round 2. The price for round-3 trading, 3
t P , reflects the information in both Rt and 
Xt. The payoff information in Rt is straightforward.  
The information in X t is as follows. In equilibrium, each dealer’s interdealer trade, 
Tit, is proportional to the customer order flow  1
it C  he receives in round-one. This implies 
that when dealers observe X t at the end of round 2 (equation 2), they can infer the 
aggregate portfolio shift on the part of the public in round 1, 1
t C . Dealers also know that, 
for a risk-averse public to re-absorb this portfolio shift in round 3, price must adjust—a 
portfolio-balance effect. In particular, price must adjust in round 3 so that  0 1 3 = + t t C C , 
where  3
t C   is given by equation (3).  
The resulting price level at the end of day t can be written as:  
   9





























   (4) 
 
where we use T to denote the day on which the regime shifts from flexible to fixed rates. 
The message of this equation is important: it describes a cointegrating relationship 
between the level of the exchange rate, cumulative macro fundamentals, and cumulative 
order flow. (This long-run relationship between cumulative order flow and the level of 
the exchange rate is not predicted by any traditional exchange-rate model.) The 
cointegrating vector is regime dependent, however.  
Under flexible rates, the change in the exchange rate from the end of day t-1 to the 
end of day t can be written as: 
 
  DPt  =  l1DRt   +  l2Xt              (5) 
 
where l1 and l2 are positive constants.
10 The portfolio-balance effects from order flow 
enter through  l2, which depends inversely on  g—the elasticity of public demand in 
equation (3)—and also on the variances 2
R s  and 
2
C s  (see Evans and Lyons 1999 for 
details).
11 The parameter l2 is commonly referred to as a price impact parameter (it 
governs the price impact of order flow).  
  The connection between equation (4) and traditional measures of macro 
fundamentals deserves some attention. For traditional measures, it is useful to distinguish 
between “narrow” fundamentals and “broad” fundamentals. Under the monetary macro 
approach, the set of variables considered fundamental (e.g., money supplies, interest 
rates, and output levels) do not include variables that affect equilibrium risk premia 
                                                                 
10 Note that we have not yet added an error term to either equation (4) or equation (5). The cointegration model we 
estimate in section 4 adds a stationary (but not necessarily white noise) error term to equation (4). When differenced, 
this adds a non-invertible moving average term to equation (5), which represents the error-correction mechanism we 
estimate. 
11 The probability p of the regime shift adds a parameter to the Evans-Lyons solution that has no qualitative impact on 
the coefficients of i nterest here, namely l2 and  l3. This model can also be used to generate multiple equilibria. 
Introducing multiple equilibria obscures the essential portfolio-balance logic, so we do not pursue this direction. 
under flexible rates (t£T) 
under fixed rates (t>T)   10 
because monetary models do not admit risk premia. Fundamental variables under this 
approach constitute the set of narrow fundamentals. In contrast, the portfolio-balance 
macro approach does admit risk premia, so variables affecting these premia become 
fundamental drivers of exchange rates under this approach (e.g., changes in hedging 
demands, risk tolerances, or asset supplies). When added to the set of narrow 
fundamentals, these variables affecting risk-premia define the set of broad fundamentals. 
In terms of equation (4), the set of narrow fundamentals includes the payoff terms, DRt, 
but does not include the portfolio-balance terms, X t.  The set of broad fundamentals 
includes all the terms (in keeping with the idea that equilibrium determination of risk 
premia is fundamental to asset pricing). As we show next, a change in regime does not 
change which variables are included within broad fundamentals, but it does alter the price 
response to variables in that set (specifically, the price response to a given amount of 
order flow—the coefficient on Xt in equation 4).  
 
Differences Across Trading Regimes 
 
Understanding the effects of the different trading regimes—and the changing role of 
order flow—comes from the effect of the exchange-rate regime on equations (2) and (3). 
Specifically, the parameter g, which represents the elasticity of public demand, is regime-
dependent. This comes from the regime-dependence of Var[DPt+1| 3
t W ] ( g being 
proportional to the inverse of this variance, per equation 3). The elimination of portfolio-
balance effects under fixed rates reduces this variance (shown below), implying that: 
 
  flexiblefixed gg <               (6) 
 
Public demand is therefore more elastic in the (credible) fixed-rate regime than the 
flexible-rate regime. The implication for the price impact parameters  l2 and  l3 in 
equation (4)—henceforth lflexible and lfixed respectively—is the following: 
 
  flexiblefixed ll >                (7) 
   11 
Thus, the exchange rate reacts more to order flow under flexible rates than under fixed 
rates. For perfectly credible fixed rates (i.e., for which Var[DPt+1| 3
t W ]=0), we have: 
 
  fixed 0 l =               (8) 
 
The exchange rate does not respond to order flow in this case. The intuition is clear: 
under perfect credibility, the variance of exchange-rate returns goes to zero because 
public demand is perfectly elastic, and vice versa.  
 
Intuition for Cointegration in Equation (4) 
 
Consider PT+1, the price at the close of the first day of the fixed-rate regime. Foreign 
exchange is a riskless asset at this point, with return variance equal to zero. A return 
variance of zero implies that the elasticity of the public’s speculative demand is infinite, 
and the price impact parameter l3 in equation (4) equals zero. This yields a price at the 
close of trading (round 3) on day T+1 of: 
 










The summation over the payoff increment DRt does not include an increment for day T+1 
because the central bank maintains DRt at zero in the fixed regime. Though X T+1 is not 
equal to zero, this has no effect on price because  l3=0, as noted. This logic holds 
throughout the fixed-rate regime.  
To understand why order flow has price impact under flexible rates, consider the 
price at the close of trading on the final flexible-rate day, day T. According to equation 
(4): 
 








RX                
   12 
At the close of day T, the payoff R T+1 is uncertain because DRT+1 is uncertain. (Recall 
that the shift in regime is random and not yet known at the close of trading on day T. 
Note too that forward-looking variables do not enter this expression due to our simple 
specification of DRt and  1
t C  as independently distributed across time with mean zero.) 
The second term is the portfolio balance term. To understand this term, note that in the 
Evans-Lyons flexible-rate model, each dealer’s trading rule is: 
 
  1
it it C T a =   
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The sum of the portfolio shifts  1
t C  over time represents changes in “effective” asset 
supply: exogenous shifts out of foreign exchange (by some agents for non-speculative 
purposes) are an increase in the net supply that the speculating public must re-absorb. 
(We couch this in terms of supply to connect with traditional portfolio-balance intuition; 
see footnote 12.) The total increase in net supply is the sum of past portfolio shifts out of 
foreign exchange,  
 









where the minus sign arises because an aggregate shift out of foreign exchange 
corresponds to  1
t C  being negative.    13 
As is standard in portfolio balance models, increases in supply lower price, and 
decreases in supply raise price. This is why a positive cumulative Xt in equation (4) raises 
price: if cumulative Xt is positive, this implies that cumulative  1
t C  is also positive, which 
is a decrease in net supply, requiring an increase in price to clear the market. X t is the 
variable that conveys this information about the decrease in net supply ( 1
t C  is 
unobservable). The round-three price on day T, PT, depends on the sum of the Xt because 
each additional decrease in supply  1
t C  requires an incremental increase in price. As 
payoff uncertainty shrinks to zero (as in the fixed-rate regime), the arrival of new Xt no 
longer induces portfolio balance effects.
12 
In our model, a credible fixed-rate regime is one in which the private sector, not 
the central bank, absorbs innovations in order flow. This theoretical point contrasts with 
extant models where central bank reserves are used to absorb innovations in order flow, 
but at a cost (e.g., selling reserves at domestic-currency prices that are too low; see, e.g., 
Guembel and Sussman 2001). Empirically, as we turn attention to testing implications of 
our model below, our understanding is that there was little intervention by the national 
central banks or the ECB in the period from May to December, 1998 (per conversations 
with ECB and national central bank officials—hard data are not available). The Bretton 
Woods era, too, provides many periods in which exchange-rate volatility was quite low, 
yet central banks were intervening very little (relative to the size of the market). 
 
3.  Data 
Our data set includes the daily value of purchases and sales in the FF/DM market 
for twelve months, January to December 1998. Electronic Broking Services (EBS), the 
                                                                 
12 Here is a simple one-period example that illustrates the basic economics of the model. An uncertain payoff R is 
realized at time 1 and the market-clearing gap E[R]–P0 will be a function of the risky asset’s net supply. In traditional 
portfolio balance models, demand D is a function of relative r eturns, and supply S is time-varying. That 
is: ([]) 0 -= % DERPS  where the tilde denotes random variation. Our model looks different. In our model (gross) supply is 
fixed. But what we are calling “net supply” is moving over time, due to demand shifts that are unrelated to E[R]–P0. 
These demand shifts are the realizations of  1 Cit  (which one could model explicitly as arising from hedging demands, 
liquidity demands, or changing risk tolerances). Conceptually, our model looks more like:  ([],) 0 -= % DERPCS  where  S  
denotes fixed gross supply and  % C  denotes shifts in net supply, that is, shifts in demand unrelated to E[R]–P0. In this 
one-period example, the higher the t=0 realization of  % C , the lower the net supply to be absorbed by the rest of the 
public, and the higher the market-clearing price P0 (to achieve stock equilibrium). In a sense, our multi-period model is 
akin to a single-period model in which net supply is “shocked” multiple times before trading takes place, each shock 
having its own incremental impact on price. 
   14 
leading foreign-exchange broker, provided the data. Each trading day (weekday) covers 
the twenty four-hour period starting from midnight GMT. 
A brief overview of the market structure may be useful for understanding the data 
and evidence.
13 There are three types of trades in the forex market: customer-dealer 
trades, direct interdealer trades, and brokered interdealer trades. Customers are non-
financial firms and non-dealers in financial firms (e.g., corporate treasurers, hedge funds, 
mutual funds, pension funds, proprietary trading desks, etc.). Dealers are marketmakers 
employed in banks worldwide (the largest 10 dealers account for more than half of the 
volume in major currencies). At the time of our sample, these three trade types accounted 
for roughly equal shares of total volume in major markets—one-third each. 
Our data come from the third trade type: brokered interdealer trading. There are two 
main interdealer broking systems, EBS and Reuters Dealing 2000-2. EBS has a much 
larger market share than Dealing 2000-2 in most currency pairs that do not involve 
sterling (including FF/DM). We estimate that our EBS sample amounts to about 18% of 
all trading in spot FF/DM in 1998. This estimate is based on comparing our EBS volume 
data with data provided by the BIS (1999) for April 1998—one of the months in our 
sample. The 18% estimate is based on the following calculations. For the FF/DM rate, the 
BIS-reported total daily volume for April 1998 was $10.1 billion (which includes spot, 
forwards, and swaps).
14 Spot transactions account for 80% of t his volume or $8.1 
billion.
15 In our EBS data, average daily spot volume in FF/DM for April 1998 amounted 
to $1.5 billion. Our EBS volume of $1.5 billion divided by the BIS total of $8.1 billion 
produces our 18% estimate. 
Three features of our data set are noteworthy. First, it spans a considerably longer 
period than previous data on order flow. For example, Evans and Lyons (1999) use four 
months of data. Second, the brokered interdealer trading it covers is the most rapidly 
growing category of trade (see BIS, 2001), and anecdotal evidence suggests that EBS is 
                                                                 
13 For more detail see Lyons (2001) and the EBS website at www.ebsp.com. Trading in other European cross rates on 
EBS was not thick enough to estimate our model on a panel of currencies. 
14 According to BIS (1999), the FF/DM currency pair accounted for 0.7% of world forex volume in April 1998, which 
in total amounted to about $1.5 trillion per day. 
15 The 80% estimate comes from the following.  According to BIS (1999), spot transactions amounted to 75% of trade 
between the DM and other EMS currencies in April 1998.  In April 1995, this figure was 86% for the FF/DM market. 
Unfortunately, no information on this percentage is provided specifically for the FF/DM market for April 1998; 80% is 
derived as an interpolation. 
   15 
also increasing its market share. Third, our data include daily order flow measured in 
terms of DM value. The Evans (1997) data, also used by Evans and Lyons (1999), 
include only order flow measured as the number of buys minus the number of sells (e.g., 
a sale of any DM amount is measured as –1).
16 This allows us to use a measure of 










where Bt and St are the DM values of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated orders on day t, 
respectively.  
The rest of the data is measured as follows. The spot exchange rate is measured as 
the French franc price of a DM and is sampled daily at the close of business in London.
17 
The interest differential is calculated from the daily Paris (PIBOR) and Frankfurt 
(FIBOR) monthly interbank offered rates.
18 These rates are also sampled at the London 
close. Both exchange rate and interest rate data are from Datastream.  
 
Institutional Details on EBS 
EBS is an electronic broking system for trading spot foreign exchange among 
dealers. It is limit-order driven, screen-based, and ex-ante anonymous (ex-post, counter-
parties settle directly with one another). The EBS screen displays the best bid and ask 
prices submitted to it together with information on the cash amounts available for trading 
at these prices. Amounts available for trading at prices other than the best bid and offer 
are not displayed. Activity fields on this screen track a dealer’s own recent trades, 
including price and amount, as well as tracking the recent trades executed on EBS 
system-wide. 
                                                                 
16 Per figure 1, our data set allows us to construct both of these two measures. They behave quite similarly. For 
example, the correlation between the two order-flow measures in the flexible-rate portion of our sample (January to 
April) is 0.98. 
17 We know of no source for transaction prices sampled at midnight GMT. Even if a source were available, it would be 
relatively noisy because the market is quite thin around that time, with wide bid-offer spreads (which generate 
measurement error due to transaction prices bouncing from bid to ask). Most all trading in FF/DM is carried out before 
the London close (there is relatively little trading in this currency pair in New York). Finally, it is not feasible for us to 
re-measure our daily order flow as of the London close because we do not have the flow data on an intraday basis.   
18 We use monthly interest rates because of the noise in the daily variation of overnight rates. Our results are not 
affected in any substantive way by this choice.   16 
There are two ways that dealers can trade currency on EBS. Dealers can either post 
prices (i.e., submit “limit orders”), which does not insure execution, or dealers can “hit” 
prices (i.e., submit “market orders”), which does insure execution. To construct a 
measure of order flow, trades are measured as positive or negative depending on the 
direction of the market order that initiates each transaction. For example, a market order 
to sell DM 10 million that is executed against a posted limit order would generate order 
flow of –10 million Deutschemarks.  
When a dealer submits a limit order, she is displaying to other dealers an intention 
to buy or sell a given cash amount at a specified price.
19 Bid prices (limit order buys) and 
offer prices (limit order sells) are submitted with the hope of being executed against the 
market order of another dealer—the “initiator” of the trade. To be a bit more precise, not 
all initiating orders arrive in the form of market orders. Sometimes, a dealer will submit a 
limit-order buy that is equal to or higher than the current best offer (or will submit a 
limit-order sell that is equal to or lower than the current best bid). When this happens, the 
incoming limit order is treated as if it were a market order, and is executed against the 
best opposing limit order immediately. In these cases, the incoming limit order is the 
initiating side of the trade.  
 
 
4.  Results 
 
The analytical results in section 2 offer five testable hypotheses that we collect here 
as a guide for our empirical analysis: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Under flexible rates, the level of the exchange rate, cumulative 
interdealer order flow, and cumulative public payoff information 
are individually nonstationary and jointly cointegrated. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Cumulative interdealer order flow remains nonstationary after the 
shift from flexible to fixed rates, but the level of the exchange rate 
and cumulative public payoff information become stationary. 
 
Hypothesis 3:  A structural break in the cointegrating relationship occurs when the 
regime shifts from flexible to fixed rates. 
                                                                 
19 EBS has a pre-screened credit facility whereby dealers can only see prices for trades that would not violate their 
counterparty credit limits, thereby eliminating the potential for failed deals because of credit issues. 
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Hypothesis 4:  Under flexible rates, error correction in the cointegrating 
relationship occurs through exchange rate adjustment, not order 
flow adjustment (weak exogeneity of order flow). 
 
Hypothesis 5:  Under flexible rates, there is no Granger causality from the 
exchange rate to order flow (strong exogeneity of order flow). 
 
 
Hypotheses 1-3 summarize the section-two discussion of equation (4). Hypotheses 4 and 
5 follow from the model’s specification of round-one public order flow as exogenous. 
This particular assumption of the model is a strong one; our cointegration framework 
provides a natural way to test its implications.   
The empirical analysis proceeds in two stages. First, we address hypotheses 1-3 by 
testing for unit roots, cointegration, and structural breaks. This first stage also examines 
the related issue of coefficient size within the cointegrating relationship. The second 
stage addresses hypotheses 4 and 5 by estimating the appropriate error-correction model 
and (separately) testing for Granger causality. 
 
4.1  Stage 1: Testing Hypotheses 1 to 3 
 
Let us begin by repeating equation (4) from the model, which establishes the 
relationship between the level of the exchange rate P t, a variable summarizing public 
information about payoffs (SDRt), and accumulated order flow (SXt).  
 





























   (4) 
 
Like Evans and Lyons (1999), we use the interest differential (PIBOR-FIBOR) as our 
under fixed rates (t>T) 
 under flexible rates (t£T)   18 




The first step is to test for the stationarity of all variables in the two sub-periods of 
1998, January 1 to May 1 and May 4 to December 31.  Table 1 shows the results of six 
Dickey-Fuller tests, one for each of the three variables in each of the two sub-periods.  
Consistent with hypothesis 1, in the first four months of 1998 all variables appear non-
stationary: the unit-root null cannot  be rejected.
21 Though predicted by our model, 
cumulative order flow being non-stationary is not obvious; indeed, a common intuition is 
that market clearing would produce cumulative order flow that rapidly reverts to zero.  
Consistent with hypothesis 2, for the remaining eight months the exchange rate and 
interest differential appear stationary (unit-root null is rejected), whereas cumulative 
order flow remains non-stationary. The combination in the latter period of a stationary 
exchange rate and non-stationary cumulative order flow is consistent with a price impact 
parameter l3 of zero, as predicted by the model. It remains to be determined whether 
equation (4) actually holds for the January1 to May 1 period, i.e., whether the variables 
are cointegrated (which we return to below). 
The bottom panel of Table 1 speaks to hypothesis 2 by implementing a univariate 
test for a structural break in the spot rate process. The two tests shown, due to Banerjee, 
Lumsdaine, and Stock (1992), are described in more detail in the table legend. The null 
for both of these tests is that spot-rate process is nonstationary over the whole sample 
period with no structural breaks in the constant or trend. In both cases, the null is 
rejected. We return to a direct test of stability in the cointegrating relationship below, 
following the cointegration results. (See also the appendix for results from implementing 
the Rigobon 1999 test for parameter stability in settings with heteroskedasticity, 
endogeneity, and omitted variables.) 
                                                                 
20 At the daily frequency, the interest differential is arguably the best public-information measure of changing 
macroeconomic conditions. That said, it does not constitute a well-specified macro model of expected payoffs. We 
return to the measurement error this entails below.  
21 Though the possibility always remains that these variables are not non-stationary, these tests indicate that they are at 
the very least close to being so (in a statistical sense), in which case proceeding with our cointegration analysis as if 
they are non-stationary is the safe route (e.g., in terms of consistency).  
   19 
Cointegration 
Because the log exchange rate, cumulative order flow, and the PIBOR-FIBOR 
interest rate differential are all non-stationary in the flexible-rate period from January to 
May 1, equation (4) only holds if they are cointegrated. We use two different procedures 
to test for cointegration: the Granger-Engle ADF test and the Johanson test. Both begin 
with a baseline model that includes the three variables of our model of section two, a 
constant, and a trend. We determine the lag length for the Johansen vector autogression 
using Sims’ likelihood ratio tests; a lag length of four allows for all significant dynamic 
effects (results available from authors on request).  
Hypothesis 1 is borne out: evidence for cointegration (rejecting the null of no-
cointegration) over the flexible-rate period is strong. Table 2 presents results for the 
Granger-Engle ADF test. In this test, the log spot rate is regressed against cumulative 
order flow, the interest differential, a constant, and a trend. (We use Phillips-Hansen fully 
modified estimation.  This is a semi-parametric technique that gives more accurate point 
estimates in small samples by diminishing second-order asymptotic bias.  It also yields 
consistent standard errors. The residuals from the regression are then tested for 
stationarity using conventional Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests.) The null of non-
cointegration is rejected at the 5 percent level, per the Dickey-Fuller tau statistics at the 
bottom. The top of the table shows the estimated coefficients (constant not reported). 
Note that the interest differential is insignificant. We do not take this insignificance to 
mean that macro does not matter (though it is in keeping with the results of Meese and 
Rogoff 1983 and the long empirical literature that followed that paper). It may be due to 
the measurement error (or mis-specification) inherent in our use of the interest 
differential for the variable R t from the model. The cointegration we find between the 
exchange rate and cumulative order flow demonstrates that the model i s indeed able to 
account for a steady state relationship. Having found significance, henceforth we focus 
on the bivariate cointegrating relationship between the exchange rate and cumulative 
order flow.
22  
                                                                 
22 The second of our cointegration tests—using the Johanson procedure—tests the null hypothesis of no-cointegration 
in the bivariate model against the alternative of a single cointegrating vector. That test is rejected at the 5 percent level 
(not reported). The Johanson procedure also suggests that there is only one cointegrating vector: A Johanson test of the 
null of one cointegrating vector against the alternative of two is not rejected at the 5 percent level. In independent work, 
Bjonnes and Rime (2001) also find evidence of cointegration between cumulative interdealer order flow and the level   20 
Next we estimate the magnitude of the coefficients in the bivariate cointegrating 
relationship (flexible-rate period). These are reported in Table 3. Of particular importance 
is the coefficient on cumulative order flow.
23 Our use of the log spot rate makes this 
coefficient easy to interpret: an increase in cumulative order flow of DM 1 billion (i.e., 
net DM purchases) increases the French franc price of a DM by 3 basis points. This is 
much smaller than the contemporaneous impact of order flow estimated by Evans and 
Lyons (1999) for the DM/$ market (roughly 50 basis points per $1 billion).
24 Three 
factors are likely to account for this. First, one must correct for the fact that the DM price 
of a dollar at the time was roughly 1.5 DM/$. This scales the Evans-Lyons coefficient 
down by about a third. Second, Evans  and Lyons are measuring the impact effect, 
whereas we are measuring the long-run impact (i.e., the persistent impact).
25 To the 
extent any of the impact effect is transitory, this will account for part of the difference. 
Finally, and perhaps most important in the context of our model, one would expect the 
sensitivity of price to order flow to be lower in the FF/DM market precisely because the 
EMS target zones were not a free float (and therefore the elasticity of absorptive private 
demand is higher). 
We turn now to evaluating hypothesis 3: a structural break should occur in the 
cointegrating relationship when the regime shifts from flexible to fixed rates. Results 
from two different tests appear in Table 4. The first, the F-test (see Hanson 1992), is akin 
to a non-stationary analog of the familiar Chow test in stationary settings. Importantly, it 
is valid for settings in which the date of the structural break is known in advance. Using 
May 4, 1998, as a known break date, the F-test rejects the null of no structural break over 
the year at the 5 percent level (column two), consistent with hypothesis 3. For robustness, 
we also tested for a structural break in the cointegrating relationship over the full year 
using a test that does not rely on knowing the break date in advance. That test, the Mean-
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
of the spot exchange rate (they examine the DM/$ and Norwegian Krona/DM markets). The relationship is not the 
focus of their paper, however; it is addressed in a closing subsection. 
23 A reassuring feature is the similarity between the modified least squares estimates in the trivariate model of Table 2 
and the maximum likelihood bivariate estimates of Table 3. 
24 Our use of the logged spot rate in estimation (rather than unlogged) makes our work directly comparable to earlier 
work. It also squares with the empirical distribution of exchange rates, which is (approximately) Lognormal. 
25  One might be tempted to check robustness of our result that order flow effects persist by regressing the level of the 
spot rate on lags of unaccumulated order flow (i.e., past daily flows). The notion being that more distant order flow lags 
might be negative. Econometrically, however, this is an unbalanced regression, mixing non-stationary and stationary 
variables, thereby undermining inference. Cointegration tests are the proper way to resolve this issue.  
   21 
F, also rejects the null of no structural break at the 5 percent level (column two). The 
Mean-F test can also be applied to specifically to the flexible-rate portion of our sample. 
There is no evidence of structural instability in the bivariate relationship over the flexible 
period from January through May 1 (p-value >20%). (For visual evidence that order 
flow’s price impact had dropped off by May 4, see the appendix.) 
 
4.2   Stage 2: Testing Hypotheses 4 and 5 
 
From the Granger representation theorem (Engle and Granger 1987), we know that 
a cointegrated system has a vector error-correction representation. Tables 5 and 6 explore 
this and its implications for whether order flow can be considered exogenous, as 
predicted by hypotheses 4 and 5. 
Table 5 presents evidence that order flow over the flexible-rate period is indeed 
weakly exogenous, as predicted by hypothesis 4. Recall that weak exogeneity of order 
flow means that error correction in the cointegrating relationship occurs through 
exchange rate adjustment, not order flow adjustment. Or, econometrically, it means that 
the error-correction term is significant in the exchange rate equation but not in the order 
flow equation. Table 5 shows that the null of weak exogeneity of order flow cannot be 
rejected at conventional levels (p-value 10 percent). In contrast, the null of weak 
exogeneity of the exchange rate is strongly rejected (p-value 1 percent).
26 It appears that 
the burden of adjustment to long-run equilibrium falls exclusively on the exchange rate. 
Table 6 presents evidence that order flow is, in fact, strongly exogenous, as 
predicted by hypothesis 5. The key result is that for the test labeled F(8,67), noted in the 
table legend with “h”. This is a test for any feedback to order flow from lagged values of 
either the exchange rate or the interest differential. Because exclusion of these variables 
from the general (unconstrained) model cannot be rejected, there is no evidence of 
Granger causality running from these variables to order flow (thus, there is no evidence 
of feedback trading). This combination of weak exogeneity and absence of Granger 
                                                                 
26  This test is based on the full information maximum likelihood approach of the Johanson (1992) procedure, which 
takes account of possible cross equation dependencies (as opposed to testing the significance of the error-correction 
term equation by equation).   22 
causality implies that cumulative order is strongly exogenous.
27 
The error-correction representation allows us to answer an important question: How 
rapidly does this system return to its long-run equilibrium? (Though important, this 
question is purely empirical in that our model makes no prediction.) The answer to this 
question comes directly from the estimate of the system’s error-correction term. That 
estimate is –0.237 (reported in appendix Table A2), implying that about one-quarter of 
departures from long-run equilibrium is dissipated each day.
28   
This result is also helpful for judging whether four months of data is sufficient to 
produce reliable analysis of cointegration. If one-quarter of any departure is dissipated 
each day, the half-life of departures is less than three days. Four months of data is enough 
to cover about 40 of these half-lives, quite a lot in the context of estimating cointegrating 
relationships. For comparison, adjustment back to the cointegrating relationship of 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) has a half-life around 5 years. One would need 200 years 
of data on a single exchange rate to estimate PPP error correction with as many half-lives 
in the sample. At the same time, we recognize that cointegration may not be literally true; 
if not, one is left with the result that order flow effects on price are very persistent, but 
not truly permanent.   
 
5.  Conclusions 
Previous t heoretical work offers three approaches to resolving the regime-
dependent volatility puzzle: flexible-rate regimes induce either additional policy shocks 
(e.g., from greater policy autonomy), additional noise (e.g., entry of noise traders), or 
additional equilibria. Our explanation of the puzzle does not rely on any of these. Instead, 
flexible rates produce additional price volatility because the market’s willingness to 
absorb unchanged shocks to order flow is reduced. (Though we chose not to do so, these 
shocks could be explicitly modeled as arising from, for example, changing risk 
preferences, changing endowment-risk hedging, or changing liquidity demands.) Under 
                                                                 
27 It is unlikely, but possible, that this lack of Granger causality is due to the six-hour mismatch in the timing of our 
order flow and exchange rate data. Remember, however, that little of the order flow in FF/DM occurs between 6pm and 
midnight GMT. For a test of an even stronger form of statistical exogeneity—strict exogeneity—see the appendix. 
28 For those less familiar with cointegration models, note that this result does not imply that order flow’s effect on price 
is transitory: this error-correction estimate applies to departures from the long-run relationship, not to the long-run 
relationship itself. Note too that the error-correction term is significant in all the specifications we examined in Table 
A2 for the exchange rate equation, with little variation in its magnitude.   23 
flexible rates, these shocks produce portfolio-balance effects on price because elasticity 
of speculative demand is (endogenously) low under flexible rates. Under credibly fixed 
rates, the elasticity of speculative demand is infinite, eliminating portfolio-balance 
effects. 
Testable implications of our explanation for the puzzle are borne out in the data. We 
use a unique data set on FF/DM order flow in 1998 to show that before the rigid parity-
rates where announced, cumulative order flow and the spot rate were cointegrated, as our 
model predicts. (This result emerges despite the FF/DM rate varying considerably less 
than major flexible rates such as DM/$.) Thus, at least some of the effects of order flow 
on the exchange rate appear to be permanent. This is contrary to received wisdom: many 
people believe that order flow has only transitory “indigestion” effects on price, but this 
is not the case.
29 After the conversion rates for the euro-participating currencies were 
announced, the FF/DM rate was decoupled from order flow. The model we develop 
predicts this as well. 
We also address the degree to which order flow can be considered exogenous, as 
our model assumes. Our findings are supportive in this regard. We find that order flow is 
(at least) strongly exogenous. This has two key implications. First, the burden of 
adjustment to long-run equilibrium falls on the exchange rate, not on order flow. Second, 
there is no Granger causality running from the exchange rate back to order flow (i.e., 
feedback trading does not appear to be present).  
It is common to characterize fixed-rate regimes in terms of the central bank’s 
willingness to trade domestic currency at a predetermined price; i.e., it is the central bank 
that absorbs the order flow. In our model, a credible fixed-rate regime is one in which the 
private sector, not the central bank, absorbs innovations in order flow. As a practical 
matter, if the central bank needs to intervene, the fixed exchange rate regime is already in 
difficulty because the private sector’s demand is no longer perfectly elastic, and the 
portfolio-balance channel is operative.  
Though we model a regime shift from flexible to fixed rates, it may be useful to 
revisit models of currency crises (i.e., shifts from fixed to flexible) with order flow’s role 
in mind. For example, our model directs attention to the variance of order flow shocks   24 
(
1
t C  in the model) and to the evolving elasticity of order-flow absorption by the private 
sector (the g coefficient in the model). Interest differentials and other empirical proxies 
for credibility and expected devaluation can be recast in terms of these other, now 
increasingly measurable variables. In this setting, policymakers take their cues on 
necessary adjustment of interest rates and reserves from the private order flows they 
observe in the market (not from a macro model). Order flows become the vehicle through 
which dispersed market information about credibility and fundamentals is manifested. At 
the same time, order flow is by no means a noiseless signal, leading (potentially) to 
learning dynamics quite different from those is macro collapse models (for work in this 
direction, see, e.g., Carrera 1999, Calvo 1999, and Corsetti, Pesanti, and Roubini 2001). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
29 Though received wisdom, it should also be noted that transitory price effects of significant size are difficult to 
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Figure 2 
 
Three Trading Rounds Within Each Day 
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Tau Statistic
a 




1 Jan 1998 - 1 May 1998 (85 obs) 
    
   Log FF/DM  -2.06    1 
   Interest Rate Differential (PIBOR-FIBOR)  -0.11    0 
   Cumulative Order Flow
c  -1.23    0 
       
4 May 1998 - 31 December 1998 (174 obs)       
   Log FF/DM  -3.02    0 
   Interest Rate Differential (PIBOR-FIBOR)  -3.00    0 
   Cumulative Order Flow   -1.91    0 
       
                                                        
Hypothesis 2: Structural Break Tests on Log FF/DM (Banerjee et al. 1992)
d 
 




Sequential Minimum ADF Unit Root Test    1492.6
   
    (0.000)   





Recursive Minimum ADF Unit Root Test 
 
  -4.41
   
a: DF 5% Critical Value for Unit Root Test with Constant: -2.84     
b: Lag length in first differences in DF Equation needed to obtain white noise error 
c: Cumulative Order Flow is the cumulated index of  Daily Cash DM buys net of DM sells   
d: Tests conducted under zero lags and no trend     
e: Critical values for the sequential F-test are 16.72 (10%), 19.01 (5%) and 21.31 (2.5%). 
f: Critical values for the recursive unit root tests are -3.24 (10%), -3.61 (5%) and -3.91 (2.5%), 
 
The top portion of the table tests the null hypothesis of a unit root in each of the three variables in our 
model over the flexible-rate and fixed-rate sub-samples (January 1 to May 1 and May 4 to December 31, 
1998, respectively). The unit-root null cannot be rejected for any of the three variables in the flexible-rate 
sub-sample. In the fixed-rate sub-sample, the unit-root null for cumulative order flow is still not rejected, 
but the null is rejected for the log spot rate and interest differential. 
 
The bottom portion of table tests the hypothesis of a structural break in the log spot rate process more 
directly using two tests proposed by Banerjee et al. (1992). The sequential test estimates the process both 
before and after each observation in the full sample. The null of the associated F test—one for each 
observation—is that the process is nonstationary with no structural breaks in the constant or trend. The 
largest of these F statistics is compared to a tabulated critical value. The rejection of this no-breaks null 
using the sequential test is overwhelming.  
 
The Recursive test shown in the bottom portion of the table also has a null of a unit root and no structural 
breaks in the constant or trend throughout the sample. In this case, one calculates a Dickey-Fuller-style unit 
root test for every sample size on an expanding basis. The smallest value (large and negative) of the test 
statistic is then compared against a critical value, obtained from Monte Carlo simulations. In this case the 




Hypothesis 1: Cointegration Test (Phillips-Hansen Estimation)
a 
 




Dependent Variable: Log FF/DM
b 
 
               





    
   Cumulative Order Flow   0.00243  3.43 
  (0.0003)   
   Interest Rate Differential (PIBOR-FIBOR)  0.1923  0.81 
  (0.15)   
   Trend  0.1762  5.21 
  (0.149)   




   




  Bivariate Dickey-Fuller Tau 
     (excludes the interest rate differential)  
     
a: Regression of Log FF/DM on a constant, a trend, and cumulative order flow   
b: Log FF/DM is multiplied by 10,000, so coefficient units are basis points per million Deutschemarks 
c: Cointegrating ADF 5%  critical value with two variables, constant and Trend: -3.78 
 




                                   Table 3   
 
Cointegrating Vector from Johansen Procedure 
                                                           1 January 1998 - 1 May 1998 
 






Cumulative Net Order Flow 
                     







                    0.145 
b   
2.69 
a: Tests for exclusion of each variable     
b: The constant is unrestricted and is not reported. The trend is restricted to be within the cointegration vector. 




Hypothesis 3: Hansen Stability Tests 
 




Jan-April 1998  
Test Description  Test-Statistic  p-value  Test-statistic  p-value 
         
F-test 
a  8.1   <5%  not applicable  not applicable 
       
         
Mean-F 
b  6.3  4.7%  1.817   >20% 
 
a: Test conditional on known break date (4 May 1998)       














Hypothesis 4: Testing for Weak Exogeneity of Order Flow 
 





   
Chisq(1)
b 
     
   Diff. FF/DM    6.95 
    (0.01) 
   Diff. Cum. Order Flow    2.80 
    (0.10) 
     
a: Tests the null hypothesis that the variable is weakly exogenous   























Hypothesis 5: Testing for Strong Exogeneity of Order Flow 
 
1 Jan 1998 - 1 May 1998 
 
 
Equation 1:  Diff. Cum. Order Flow 
   
Coeff. (Excl. Lags) 
      
T-statistic (Excl. Lags) 
           
Dependent Variable: Diff. Cum. Order Flow       
           
    Constant      6.240  0.233   
    Diff. Cum. Order Flow(-1)      0.258  2.41   
           
Diagnostics           
           
         General Order Flow Returns Model Specification
a                                Final Model Specification
b 
             R
2 (adjusted)    4.0%            R
2 (adjusted)    5.5% 
Q (36) p-value
c    0.67  Q (36) p-value    0.36 
  F-Test
d  p-value    F-Test  p-value 
F(4,67)
e  1.90  0.12  F(11,67)
i  0.865  0.570 
F(4,67)
f  0.55  0.69  F(1,67)
j  5.37  0.023 
F(4,67)
g  1.43  0.23       
F(8,67)
h  1.08  0.35       
           
a : General model includes constant,  Diff.Cum Order Flow(-1 to -4), Diff. Pibor-Fibor(-1 to -4) and Diff. FF/DM(-1 to -4) 
b: Final model includes constant and Diff. Cum. Order Flow( -1)     
c: This tests for residual autocorrelation up to 36th order      
d: All F tests relate to exclusions from the general model     
e: Test for the exclusion of  Diff. Pibor-Fibor (-1 to -4)       
f: Test for the exclusion of  Diff. Log FF/DM (-1 to 4)       
g: Test for the exclusion of  Diff. Cum. Order Flow (-1 to -4)       
h: Test for exclusion of Diff. FF/DM(-1 to -4) and Diff. Pibor-Fibor (-1 to -4)     
i: Test for exclusion of all variables except Diff. Cum. Order Flow( -1)     
j: Test for exclusion of Diff. Cum. Order Flow(-1)       
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Testing Structural Shifts versus Changing Shock Variance (Rigobon 1999) 
 
Rigobon (1999) proposes a powerful and flexible test for parameter stability in 
settings with possible heteroskedasticity, endogeneity, and omitted variables. (Previous 
tests are unable to  handle all three simultaneously.) His DCC
30 test is based on the 
assumption that the data can be divided into two sub-samples: a tranquil and a turbulent 
period, with a known break. The null hypothesis is that heteroskedasticity is caused by a 
shift in the variance of just one of the shocks affecting the system, which can include 
structural shocks or innovations in unobservable omitted variables. The alternative 
hypothesis is that the heteroskedasticity is caused by parameter change. The test is simple 
to implement: the variance-covariance matrix is calculated for each sub-sample, the two 
estimated matrices are subtracted, and the determinant of their difference is calculated. 
Under the null, the determinant is zero. Large absolute values provide evidence of 
parameter instability. 
Though Rigobon’s test is designed for systems that exhibit change from tranquility 
to turbulence (e.g., contagious transmission of a financial crisis from one country to 
another), there is no reason why the test cannot be applied to systems that move in the 
opposite direction, such as ours. The null, in our case, is that the volatility of the FF/DM 
rate simply declined without any structural change at the beginning May 1998. The 
alternative is that fundamental parameter change occurred, which is what we contend 
(that the cointegrating relationship between the nominal exchange rate and cumulative 
order flow disintegrated). 
Table A1 presents results for the DCC test in our sample.
31 One of the maintained 
hypotheses for the test is that the decline in volatility is due to a decline in a single 
structural variance. The longer the second sub-sample, the more implausible that 
                                                                 
30 Acronym for determinant of the change in covariance matrix. 
31 The distribution of the DCC test is non-standard and dependent on nuisance parameters. The standard deviations and 
p-values in the table are obtained by bootstrapping. A  Gauss program to implement this is available from 
rigobon@mit.edu. For the three sub-samples studied in this paper, the distribution for the DCC statistic is available 
from the authors on request.   35 
assumption is (lowering the power of the test). On the other hand, the shorter the second 
sub-sample, the less precise are the estimates of the covariance matrix, making the size of 
the test unreliable. To balance these considerations, we look at three different lengths for 
the second sub-sample. For the longest period—May to December 1998—parameter 
stability is rejected. For the shortest period—May 1998 only—parameter stability cannot 
be rejected. Both of these results are suspicious for the reasons given above. Most 
convincing is the result for the intermediate period, May and June 1998. This test rejects 
parameter stability at the 5% level, providing further support for treating the period 



















May and June 1998 
 
-12166  3.5 
May to December 1998 
 




Visual Evidence that Order Flow’s Impact on Price Drops Off  
 
Though not appropriate statistically (given the cointegrating relationship), it is 
nevertheless instructive to consider the time pattern of coefficients i n a regression of 
exchange rate changes on order flows. The following Figure A1 provides some visual 
evidence from a rolling regression of FF/DM changes (50 observation window) on 
current and past (up to lag 5) order flows. The solid line plots the sum of those order-flow 
coefficients that are statistically significant in the January to May 1 sample (the 
                                                                 
32 The DCC result does not permit us to conclude that the relationship between FF/DM and order flow changed from a 
cointegrating relationship to a non-cointegrating one, nor that May 2/3 is the date of change. A version of this test has 
not yet been developed for the case of an unknown break (nor can it be specific about the precise nature of the 
parameter instability).   36 
coefficients are summed at each window-sample snap shot). The plot begins in mid-
March to accommodate the 50 (trading day) rolling period. The plot indicates a clear drop 
off of order flow impact. The timing of the drop off is also suggestive of market 




















































































































































































































Sum of Coefficients from Rolling Regresson of FF/DM  Returns on Lag 1, 3 and 4 of Differences in Net Orderflow
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Testing Strict Exogeneity of Order Flow 
 
Given the e vidence in section 4 that order flow is strongly exogenous, for 
completeness we test for strict exogeneity (a stronger concept than weak and strong 
exogeneity). Although our model also predicts strict exogeneity, the economic content of 
this prediction is less substantive than the notions of weak and strong exogeneity that 
underlie hypotheses 4 and 5 (which is why we address it in the appendix).  One can test 
for strict exogeneity (given strong exogeneity) by testing the significance of 
contemporaneous order flow (i.e., differenced cumulative order flow) in the error-
correction equation for the exchange rate. Including contemporaneous order flow 
amounts to a test for contemporaneous correlation across the two innovations in the two-
equation vector error-correction representation.
33 If order flow is strictly exogenous, the 
coefficient on contemporaneous order flow should be insignificant.   
From the result corresponding to note “e” in Table A2 (in bold), order flow does 
appear to be strictly exogenous: a test of excluding this variable cannot be rejected at 
conventional levels (p-value 34 percent). The top of the table presents coefficient 
estimates for the final error-correction model, which includes only those variables that 
enter significantly. The remainder of the table presents various diagnostics relevant to the 
two models (the general model, which includes all variables, and the final model with 
only the significant variables). 
 
 
                                                                 
33  If order flow is weakly exogenous, then our vector error-correction representation can be reduced to a single 
equation, and the coefficient on the contemporaneous variable takes the sign of the correlation between the two 





Testing Strict Exogeneity 
 
1 Jan 1998 - 1 May 1998 
 
 
Equation 2:  Diff. Log FF/DM 
     
Coeff. (Excl. Lags) 
        
T-statistic (Excl. Lags) 
           
Dependent Variable: Diff. Log FF/DM         
           
    Constant      0.210  1.45 
    ECM(-1)      -0.237  -3.10 
    Diff. Cum. Order Flow(-1)      0.002  2.74 
    Diff. Cum. Order Flow(-3)      -0.001  -2.36 
    Diff. Cum. Order Flow(-4)      0.001  2.66 
           
Diagnostics           
           
                General FF/DM  Returns Model Specification
a                               Final Model Specification
b 
                  R
2 (adjusted)    20.7%          R
2 (adjusted)    24.5% 
Q (36) p-value
c    0.97  Q (36) p-value    0.97 
  F-Test
d  p-value    F-Test  p-value 
F(1,65)
e  0.94  0.34  F(11,65)
j  0.637  0.778 
F(1,65)
f  6.15  0.02  F(4,65)
k  5.88  0.000 
F(4,65)
g  0.06  0.99       
F(4,65)
h  3.69  0.01       
F(4,65)
i  0.72  0.58 
 
     
a :General Model: constant,  Diff. Cum Order Flow(0 to -4), Diff. Pibor-Fibor(-1 to -4), Diff. FF/DM(-1 to -4) and ECM(-1) 
b: Final model includes constant, ECM(-1) and Diff. Cum. Order Flow(-1,-3, -4); coefficient values reported at top of table 
c: This tests for residual autocorrelation up to 36th order        
d: All F tests relate to exclusions from the general model       
e: Test for the exclusion of  contemporaneous Diff. Cum. Order Flow     
f: Test for the exclusion of ECM(-1)            
g: Test for the exclusion of  Diff. Log FF/DM (-1 to -4)       
h: Test for the exclusion of  Diff. Cum. Order Flow (-1 to -4)       
i: Test for exclusion of Pibor-Fibor (-1 to -4)         
j:  Test for the exclusion of all variables except ECM(-1) and Diff. Cum. Order Flow (-1 ,-3, -4)    
k: Test for the exclusion of ECM(-1) and Diff. Cum. Order Flow (-1,-3,-4)     
 
 
 
 